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Anticompetitive Concerns of Internet
Based B2B Marketplaces:




On February 25,2000, General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor
Company, and DaimlerChrysler announced a plan to form a joint
venture, Covisint, to develop an Internet based business-to-business
("B2B") marketplace for the automotive industry! Together with
Nissan and Renault, who have since joined the venture, the
automakers plan to move a total of $250 billion of spending among
60,000 suppliers to the marketplace.2 Covisint is the first Internet
based marketplace not founded by independent companies seeking to
become third party vendors for industry players. Since the Covisint
announcement, several other industry led Internet based exchanges
have been announced The 2001 recession, which dried up capital
markets, coupled with the rise of industry investment, has meant that
industry led B2B ventures supplanted independent companies as the
leader in these efforts.4
Covisint was the first industry led exchange subject to Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") scrutiny. As required
by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act ("HSR"), the
automakers notified the Commission in June 2000 of their intent to
form Covisint, and the Commission began an investigation into
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law 2002.
1. See Covisint.com, About Us, at http://www.covisint.comlinfo/about.shtml.




5. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2000).
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potential anticompetitive concerns. 6  Under the HSR, the
Commission assesses whether the proposed business plan violates
section 7 of the Clayton Act before granting approval to a proposed
venture Section 7 of the Clayton Act prevents the acquisition of
stock or securities in another company "in any line of commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce... the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."s On September 11, 2000 the FTC terminated the HSR
waiting period for Covisint and closed its investigation, permitting the
automakers to proceed in developing Covisint.
The FTC ruling was trumpeted as a victory for Covisint and
industry led Internet marketplaces. One Covisint executive
expounded: "While the FTC's inquiry was extended and thorough,
Covisint has been carefully planned from the beginning to address
potential concerns that might arise as a result of... forming a
business-to-business exchange."9  The media parroted the auto
industry, Wall Street and other supporters' enthusiasm, ignoring the
actual merits of the ruling. For instance, soon after the FTC decision,
the Financial Times reported, "the FTC found that Covisint would
create unparalleled efficiencies and cost savings-setting an
important precedent in the B2B arena."1
The ruling was seen not only to bless the Covisint venture, but
was characterized as an official government blessing, opening the way
for other industry led Internet marketplaces. One industry pundit
observed: "The approval of the deal has huge implications for the
rest of the market. Not having to stand behind the cloak of the
government gives competitors opportunities to collaborate. It's a
win-win situation because it leads to better standards, increased
efficiency, and more supplier connections.1 2 The FTC ruling was
viewed as "a positive for folks such as Elemica and Envera [chemical
6. See FTC Terminates HSR Waiting Period for Covisint B2B Venture, FTC TODAY,
Sept. 11, 2000, available at http:/lwww.ftc.govlopal2000l09/covisint.htm [hereinafter
Covisint B2B Venture].
7. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
8. Id.
9. Press Release, Alice Miles, Covisint Executive Planning Team, Covisint Receives
FTC Antitrust Clearance, at http://www.covisint.comlaboutlpressroomlpr/covisint3.shtml.
10. See Mariko Sanchanta, Survey-World Economy: Sales up yet profit is still an
elusive concept, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 22,2000, at 27.
11. Covisint Internet exchange clears hurdle, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sept. 12,
2000, at 11.
12. Sanchanta, supra note 10, at 27 (quoting Bruce Temkin, B2B research director for
Forrester Research).
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industry marketplaces] because it, in a sense, endorses the idea that
they can be good enterprises."13
Covisint's and the B2B marketplace industry's statements have
grossly mischaracterized the FTC ruling. FTC Commissioner Mozelle
Thompson stated that though Covisint was not challenged during the
HSR waiting period, its future conduct remains subject to antitrust
scrutiny,14 and that Covisint's approval represents a cautionary flag
rather than a green light. 5 Contrary to the industry's spin, the FTC's
ruling actually deferred making a judgment on anticompetitive issues
because the Commission did not have enough information on the
operations or structure of Covisint in such an early stage of
development." The FTC decision underscored the undeveloped
nature of the Covisint joint venture and reserved "the right to take
such further action as the public interest may require., 17 In the ruling,
the FTC explicitly provided that Covisint would still be closely
watched for antitrust abuses that could arise once it is up and
running." Most notably, the Commission did not address the merits
of whether the formation of Covisint violates section 7 of the Clayton
Act or other potential antitrust concerns.1
One estimate puts the number of B2B marketplaces currently in
existence at over 700, with a growth to 5000 within 2 years," while
Jupiter Research has estimated that up to 1500 such marketplaces are
currently in existence.21  Marketplaces serving the aeronautics,
13. Esther D'Amico, FTC Approves Formation of Automakers' Exchange, CHEM.
WEEK, Sept. 20,2000, at 15.
14. See Thompson Urges B2B Lawyers to Study Specific Markets, in FTC: WATCH
No. 555 at 3 (Nov. 20,2000).
15. See Commissioner Thompson on B2B trends, in FTC: WATCH No. 552 at 4 (Oct. 9,
2000).
16. See Covisint B2B Venture, supra note 6. ("[T]he Commission noted that, because
Covisint is in the early stages of its development and has not yet adopted by laws,
operating rules, or terms for participant access, because it is not yet operational, and
because its founders represent such a large share of the automobile market, the
Commission cannot say that implementation of the Covisint venture will not cause
competitive concerns.").
17. See Closed Investigations, in FTC: WATCH No. 552 at 1 (Oct 9,2000).
18. Ashley Dunn & Terril Yue Jones, FTC Approves Car Makers' B2B Web
Exchange, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12,2000, at C1.
19. See Covisint B2B Venture, supra note 6.
20. Peter D. Henig, Revenge of the Bricks, RED HERRING, Aug. 3, 2000, available at
http://www.redherring.comlmaglissue8l/mag-revenge-81.html.
21. Id. Any one industry may have several B2B marketplaces run by industry
participants or third parties in the areas of development and/or operations. McKinsey &
Co's E-Commerce Practice director Ron Farmer claims 121 marketplaces serve the
electricity, oil, natural gas and chemical markets. See Old Wine in New Bottles?, in FTC:
WATCH No. 554 at 4 (Nov. 6,2000).
A search of the Internet for B2B marketplaces for the seafood industry, for example,
has at least nine exchanges set up serving hatcheries, fishers, and processors:
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automobile, farming, consumer products, paper, medical products
and retailing industries have been announced or are already
operating.' The rush to develop exchanges that promise lower
procurement costs, lower cost of goods, and efficiencies in developing
and marketing products has enabled many marketplaces to develop
without much attention to potential anticompetitive problems.
In their rush to market, however, marketplaces such as Covisint
have failed to realize or acknowledge that many of the business
models they are trumpeting violate the Sherman Act's restrictions on
information sharing and collusion. Transparent systems allow buyers
and sellers to monitor others' transactions, prices, and quantities.
EBay avoids antitrust issues because of a complete lack of market
power in any market. 3 An industry led marketplace, on the other
hand, that controls a substantial segment of a market, would allow
sellers and buyers to collude to set prices, gain access to information
to which none would have access on their own, and the ability to
exercise monopsony power.
Soon after ending the Covisint HSR waiting period, FTC
chairman Robert Pitosfky observed, "we need to make sure that
[B2B marketplaces] don't undermine incentives for innovation,
because we don't want people [saying,] 'Hey, we're high-tech,
antitrust laws don't apply to us."'24 The FTC has been trying to make
clear that the antitrust laws will apply in cyberspace as they have
applied in the offline world. In order to determine what structures of
Internet based marketplace systems would comply with existing
antitrust law, it is necessary to first examine the marketplaces at issue,
the structure of B2B marketplaces, and the technologies involved.
Fishmonger.com, eFoodManager.com, Seabex.com, Ozeseafood.com, Worldcatch,
Seafood.com, GoTradeSeafood.com, gofish.com, and Globalfoodexchange.com. A search
of the Internet for B2B marketplaces serving the aerospace industry reveals the following
seventeen companies: Aeropspan.com, Aeromanager, AeroV.com, aeroXchange,
aviationX, Avolo, Exostar, FastAero.com, GECustomer Web (aircraft engines),
IlSmart.com, MyAircraft, myboeingfleet.com, PartsBase.com, Skyfish.com, Spec2000.com,
TradeAir.com, and TRW Aeronautical Systems.
22. See Clare Ansberry, Let's Build an Online Supply Network!, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17,
2000, at B1.
23. Ebay (http://www.ebay.com), an Internet based auction house, has provided a base
model for the marketplaces of many B2B ventures.





A. Incentives for Industries to Create Internet Marketplaces
While an Internet based marketplace may take several forms, the
basic concept is for a "distinct system of suppliers, distributors,
commerce service providers, infrastructure providers and customers
that use the Internet for communications and transactions. ' ' 5
Industry led marketplaces are formed with the specific purpose of
reducing costs in an entire supply chain through several means. First,
by transforming the procurement process from a haphazard collection
of catalogues, phone calls, faxes, and purchase orders into a
streamlined electronic process, the cost of purchasing is dramatically
reduced. For example, General Motors, with over 100,000 purchase
orders a year, currently spends an average of $125 to process a single
purchase order offline.' The cost reduction from streamlined
procurement has been estimated to be from 5-15%, depending upon
the level of integration in the industry.27
Second, marketplaces created by industry players, who are the
sole or a significant number of the buyers or sellers of goods in a
market, can use auctions, reverse auctions, and requests for proposals
to minimize the cost of goods or maximize revenue? Reverse
auctions permit buyers to pit sellers against each other, each offering
a lower price in order to win the buyers' business. Auction sales
allow sellers to maximize profit by selling a limited number of goods
to the buyers willing to pay the highest prices. For example, at an
FTC public workshop discussing B2B marketplaces, Sam Kinney,
executive vice-president of Free Markets, Inc., claimed that reverse
auctions had reduced United Technologies procurement costs 42%
for printed circuit boards. 9
B. Marketplace Structures and Anticompetitive Concerns
Whether any particular Internet based marketplace will run afoul
of antitrust regulators significantly depends on the structure of the
25. Tapscot, supra note 2.
26. Id.
27. See Trevor Williams, Measuring the 'new economy', LLOYDS BANK ECON. BULL.,
Sept. 30,2000, at 1; see also Transcript, FTC Public Workshop: Competition Policy in the
World of B2B Electronic Marketplaces (June 29, 2000), at 53-54, 63-69, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/index/htm [hereinafter Transcript] (Patrick Stewart, CEO of
MetalSite, LP., an Internet marketplace serving the metals industry, explained that
MetalSite has streamlined the distribution process by eliminating manual processing.).
28. See Robert E. Bloch & Scott P. Perlman, Analysis of Antitrust Issues Raised by
B2B Exchanges: Practical Guidelines and Insights from the FTC B2B Workshop,
ANTITRUST REP., Sept. 15 2000.
29. See Transcript, supra note 27, at 80-85.
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marketplace. FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson has advised
antitrust practitioners involved in B2B marketplaces to study how the
specific market operates to determine anticompetitive effects because
"antitrust issues cannot be solved in a vacuum."30
Generally, a marketplace can take one of three forms. Covisint
is attempting to enter a pyramid shaped industry-a few buyers of
goods at the top of the pyramid (in this case, Ford, General Motors,
DaimlerChrysler, and others) that buy from thousands of suppliers.
Another example of a pyramid structured venture, founded by a
consortium of aerospace companies-Boeing, Lockheed Martin,
BAE and Raytheon-will create a marketplace for those four buyers
to transact business with 37,000 suppliers.3 Other industries, such as
the steel or energy industries, can be represented as a reverse
pyramid-relatively few sellers reaching a multitude of buyers.
Finally, an industry can be fragmented with a multitude of buyers and
sellers, such as the office supply, food processing, or electronics
industries.
A B2B marketplace may have several components in addition to
a commercial exchange. Often the sites serve as more than just a
platform for managing transactions between members and may
include industry news,' a forum for members to discuss issues on
electronic bulletin boards,33 and job boards.' Covisint offers
collaboration tools encompassing product design and marketing to
allow members to work together to create new products." Many
industry led B2B marketplaces also offer supply chain integration
services-systems that link purchasers and vendors electronically,
thereby allowing for efficient, automated purchasing and distribution,
which until recently was limited to expensive proprietary systems.
36
It is the transactional components of B2B marketplaces that
make them so appealing to their members and so worrisome to
antitrust practitioners. These systems can take a variety of forms. At
their simplest, a marketplace may just provide a forum where buyers
can place requests for quotes (or bids) ("RPQ"). Sellers place offers
and participants negotiate the terms of the sale in a traditional
manner. Other sites act as electronic catalogs, where a variety of
sellers post their products in a single database, which buyers can
browse and from which they can buy items directly.
30. Thompson urges B2B lawyers to study specific markets, supra note 14.
31. Janet McDavid & Carey Roush, Antitrust Electronic Media, THE NAT'L L.J., July
17,2000, at B7.
32. See, e.g., Myairplane.com at http://www.myairplane.com.
33. See, e.g., Transora.com at http://www.transora.com.
34. See, e.g., Myairplane.com, supra note 32.
35. See, e.g., Covisint.com at http://www.covisint.com.
36. See id.; see also Transora.com, supra note 33.
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Auctions and reverse auctions are the most complex systems, but
they promise the greatest price competitiveness and efficiency. In a
standard auction format, a seller posts a product to sell along with a
minimum price and terms of the sale. Buyers then bid up the price or
terms until the auction period ends and the bidder with the highest
price or best terms wins. In the reverse auction format, a buyer
places a request for goods on the marketplace. Sellers then bid either
price or terms, trying to make the most favorable offer to the buyer.
At the end of the auction, the seller with the best price or terms will
be chosen to complete the transaction.
Covisint operates all three types of transaction systems."
Covisint allows suppliers to provide pricing for a broad array of
products and services through online catalogs that allow sellers to
specify prices for different users as well as maintain a general price
list." Covisint's auction systems support both regular and reverse
auctions by allowing a member to originate auctions for products or
services it wishes to sell or buy. 9 Covisint also offers a "request for
quote" or "bid system" that allows one to evaluate bids and quotes
based on quality, service, technology, and price." The system also
enables buyers to solicit bids from multiple suppliers and, in turn,
suppliers can see both their customers' current and new
requirements.41
H. Per Se Ilegality and the Rule of Reason
Joint ventures, as defined by their participants, may be arranged
in several forms and it is necessary to apply an antitrust analysis to
each of them. FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky, in an article entitled A
Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, stated, "attaching
the label 'joint venture' . . . tells one virtually nothing useful about the
likely legality of an arrangement under the antitrust laws," 2 a
sentiment echoed by Herbert Hovenkamp ("to characterize
something as a 'joint venture' is to say nothing about its effect on
competition or its legality under the antitrust laws."). 3 A joint
venture that involves an agreement with the primary effect of directly
restraining trade or hindering competition will be considered per se
illegal, while other agreements with procompetitive benefits and only





42. 74 GEO. LJ. 1605, 1606 (1986).
43. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 186 (1994).
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ancillarX anticompetitive concerns will be evaluated under the rule of
reason.
A. Per Se Illegality
An agreement formed for the sole purpose of setting prices, in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act would be nothing more than
a "price fixing cartel" that would be a per se violation of the antitrust
laws.4" A combination that involves an agreement to restrain trade is
not legal just because it is termed a joint venture by the participants.6
A cartel is a combination that involves a complete loss of
independent decision-making control regarding competitive issues
that can include price, production, and allocation of customers.47
Cartels do not generally include an economically efficient integration
of the participants that results in benefits to consumers.' Since such
agreements offer no procompetitive benefits, they are considered per
se illegal under modern antitrust law.
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, an agreement
among medical practitioners had the effect of requiring 70% of
medical practitioners to adhere to a fixed fee schedule created by
Maricopa County Medical Society.49 The Court determined that the
combination did not cause the practitioners to offer any different
product or service even though they had "pool[ed] ... capital and
share[d] the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit."'5
There, the lack of any procompetitive benefits, coupled with an
apparent purpose of maximizing profit among garticipants, was a per
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Similarly, in United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., the Court found a per se violation of
section 1 where the sole purpose of the joint venture was to divide
sales territory with no attempt at achieving procompetitive benefits
through economic integration.52
B. Rule of Reason
A combination that results in any level of genuine economic
integration with attendant social benefits, including procompetitive
benefits, will be analyzed under the rule of reason, rather than being
44. Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Scrutiny of Joint Ventures: Antitrust Analysis of Joint
Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 701 (1998).
45. Id. at 712.
46. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593,597-98 (1951).
47. Werden, supra note 44, at 712.
48. Id.
49. 457 U.S. 332,339-41 (1982).
50. Id. at 356.
51. Id. at 357.
52. 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972).
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per se illegal. 3 While the Sherman Act literally prohibits every
agreement in "restraint of trade," the Supreme Court has held that
"Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation" of the
statute.' Since Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, the
Court has recognized that some restraints may be reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances.5  Standard Oil requires "the
factfinder to decide whether under all the circumstances... the
restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition."5 6 The agreement must be narrowly circumscribed and
reasonably related to the economic integration and reasonably
necessary to achieve the expected procompetitive benefits.' Under
this rule, the agreement is evaluated based upon the level of
competition before and after the integration. 8 According to the
Guidelines for Collaboration, the relevant inquiry is whether the
"agreement likely harms competition by increasing the ability or
incentive profitably to raise prices above or reduce output, quality,
service, or innovation below what would likely prevail in the absence"
of the agreement
59
According to Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United
States, the rule of reason begins with an analysis of the agreement to
determine the business purpose of the agreement and whether the
agreement has already caused anticompetitive harm.' Justice
Brandeis provided what has become the classic recitation of the rule
of reason, "the true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.,
61
If the parties to the agreement are unable to exercise market
power, on their own or in tandem, and the nature of the agreement
indicates no anticompetitive harm, the venture will pass the rule of
reason.62  Alternatively, if an agreement is found to contain a
likelihood of anticompetitive harm because of the existence of market
power, it will violate the rule of reason unless procompetitive benefits
offset the anticompetitive harms. 63
53. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.2 (2000) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
54. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 342-43.
55. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
56. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 343.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. GUIDELINES, supra note 53.
60. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also GUIDELINES, supra note 53.
61. ChL Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
62. See GUIDELINES, supra note 53.
63. See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. 756, 770-71 (1999) (an agreement with an obvious
anticompetitive effect, determinable from the language, would violate the rule of reason);
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Determining the existence of market power is done by evaluating
the type of economic activity at issue.6' For a seller, market power is
the "ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for
a significant period of time."65 A seller may be able to exercise
market power regarding competitive components other than price,
such as quality, service or innovation. 6 For a buyer, market power is
the "ability profitably to depress the price paid for a product below
the competitive level for a significant period of time" resulting in
depressed output.
Where analysis of an agreement reveals actual or potential
anticompetitive harm, it may be permitted under the rule of reason if
the procompetitive benefits outweigh the harm.6' Competitor
collaborations may enable companies to offer goods or services that
have added value to consumers, are better quality, cheaper, or
61brought to the market more quickly than without the collaboration.
It has also been recognized that efficiency gains are often the result of
competitors combining resources in a manner that would have been
difficult or impossible for one firm to accomplish.70 The FTC has
recognized that "efficiencies generated through competitor
collaboration can enhance the ability and incentive of the
collaboration and its participants to compete, which may result in
lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products."'"
Though based on new technologies, potential efficiencies from
Internet based B2B marketplaces can easily be reviewed applying a
current understanding of antitrust law. The difficulty arises when
attempting to determine the potential anticompetitive harms that may
arise from these new technologies and business models.
I. Anticompetitive Concerns of B2B Marketplaces
A. Overview of Potential Anticompetitive Concerns
FTC Policy and Evaluation Office Assistant Director David
Balto has observed that the reasons why marketplaces must be run by
industry participants with substantial market share have not been well
see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); see also
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of The Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104,106-10.




68. See id. § 3.3.
69. See id. § 3.36.
70. See id.
71. Id.
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articulated, which increases the concern these participants will use the
marketplace to obtain advantages to which they would not have
otherwise been entitled." At the FTC workshop, panelists Patrick
Stewart of MetalSite and Andra P. Dupont of Dow Chemical
Company believed that industry leadership was required to achieve
the promised efficiencies of B2B marketplaces. 73 To achieve these
efficiencies, Stewart and Dupont reasoned, requires the extensive
resources of industry leaders, and the ability to attract substantial
transaction volume to the marketplace. While few non-industry led
marketplaces have achieved the transaction volume of industry led
efforts, the sheer number of independent marketplaces rebuts the
contention that the necessary resources cannot be obtained outside
the industry. Therefore, Mr. Balto's and the FFC's concern is
justified. Antitrust regulators examining the efficacy of an industry
led marketplace, must examine if the countervailing benefits
outweigh the harm on competition.
An industry led B2B marketplace is analyzed as a joint venture
or competitor collaboration under current antitrust laws.75  FTC
Policy Planning Office Assistant Director Gail Levine told a
conference on energy, e-business, and information technology that
the three major issues raised by B2Bs are: information exchange,
joint purchasing, and exclusionary practices. 76  Commissioner
Thompson believes that online marketplaces are susceptible to many
of the same antitrust concerns that plague offline markets including
exclusive dealing, collusion, price-fixing, tipping of network markets,
monopsony, competitive information spillover, and abuse of standard
setting procedures.' The efficiencies that make B2B marketplaces
valuable business entities do not absolve them from compliance with
the Sherman Act and without "technological and procedural
safeguards, B2B marketplaces may inadvertently make it easier to
72. FTC Enforcers Believe B2B Auctions Are Similar to JVs, in FFC: WATCH No. 542,
at 6 Apr. 10, 2000 [hereinafter Enforcers].
73. See Transcript, supra note 27, at 68-70, 317-18.
74. See id.
75. See GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 1.2 (While relevant to B2B issues, these
guidelines were not issued specifically in response to the growth of B2B marketplaces, but
have been in development for several years.); see also Enforcers, supra note 72; see also
Paul A. Greenberg & Lori Enos, FTC and DOJ Issue Joint Antitrust Guidelines, E-
COMMERCE TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, available at
http://wwvw.ecommercetimes.comlperl/printer/2930; William Blumenthal, B2B Internet
Exhanges: The Antitrust Basics, ANTITRUST REPORT, May 2000, at 34; Bloch and
Perlman, supra note 28.
76. Covisint B2B Venture, supra note 6.
77. Commissioner Thompson on B2B Trends, supra note 15.
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create antitrust problems, especially in highly concentrated markets
with limited numbers of players." 8
B. Threshold Concerns: Is a B2B Marketplace A Cartel Or Joint Venture?
The threshold issue of analysis is to determine whether the
formation of an industry led B2B marketplace will be analyzed as a
joint venture or a cartel formed for the purpose of engaging in
anticompetitive behavior. According to the FTC Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, an agreement by
competitors to fix prices or to allocate markets, customers, or
suppliers is per se illegal.79 A joint venture is legitimate only if it
provides a new service or product that would not have been possible
without collaboration or if "it involves substantial economic
integration likely to result in significant efficiencies."'  A legitimate
joint venture will be evaluated under the rule of reason, balancing the
venture's anticompetitive effects, actual or potential, against the
procompetitive benefits."
Avoiding application of a rule of per se illegality requires only an
application of a current understanding of traditional antitrust law-
agreements that would not have been permitted in an offline venture
are not legitimate just because they involve the Internet. Otherwise,
an industry led marketplace should be evaluated under the rule of
reason as a legitimate joint venture. The joint venture creates a
marketplace (a new service) that the founders would not have
otherwise been able to realize, producing efficiencies of reduced
procurement and transactional costs.8
C. Monopsony and Monopoly Power
In a monopsony market, one or a few buyers control a significant
amount of the purchasing of a particular good or service, permitting
them to exercise price control over sellers. According to the
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, joint purchasing,
accounting for less than 20 percent of the total products or purchases
of an industry, will not raise monopsony issues.' Even a purchasing
agreement among competitors which implicates more than 20% of a
78. Id.
79. See GUIDELINES, supra note 53.
80. See id. § 3.2; see also Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28.
81. See GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 3.2.; see also Block & Perlman, supra note 28.
82. See Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28.
83. RICHARD POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 148 (2d ed. 1981) ("Monopoly is the term used to
describe the situation where there is only one seller of a product, monopsony where there
is only one buyer.").
84. See GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 3.34.
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market may not be a per se violation of antitrust laws, but is
evaluated under the rule of reason to determine if the procompetitive
benefits outweigh the risk of improper use of monopsony power.
The FTC determined that purchasing agreements with
procompetitive benefits, such as "enabling participants to centralize
ordering, to combine warehousing or distribution functions more
efficiently, or to achieve other efficiencies" meet the rule's
requirements.'
Agreements that create or enhance market power or that
provide incentive to exercise market power, violate the rule of reason
because they increase buyers' ability to control the price of purchased
products." In a typical monopsony situation, a coordinated group of
buyers uses its combined market power to drive the price of
purchased products down, making the sale of those products less
profitable for sellers, who are forced to cut output.8 Absent the
purchasing agreement, no market player would have been able to
exercise the same market power necessary to control prices,
therefore, such agreements violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.8
The Guidelines for Collaboration also note that buying collaborations
may facilitate collusion either by "standardizing participants' costs or
by enhancing the ability to project or monitor participant's output
level through knowledge of its input purchases. '9°
Participants in a B2B marketplace, who do not have a formal or
even explicit agreement, can still violate the Sherman Act through
implicit collusion. Though section 1 requires the existence of an
agreement, the courts have not interpreted the Act to require an
overt understanding or agreement between colluders.9' Liability for
violation of the Act may be based upon any type of concerted
action,' defined as a form of activity meeting the "contract,
combination.., or conspiracy" requirement of section 1.9' A "unity
of purpose or a common design and understanding or a meeting of
the minds in an unlawful arrangement" will suffice to meet the
requirements of the Act.' Thus, the Sherman Act would allow






89. See id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
90. See GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 3.31(a).
91. See Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1994).
92. See id.
93. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434,445-46 (3rd Cir. 1977).
94. Alvord-Polk, 37 F.3d at 999.
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Implicit price fixing is a significant concern in an improperly
structured industry led marketplace. If the marketplace allowed all
participants to see bids and offers placed by all other participants, two
or more participants, who together are a monopsonist, could easily set
a price in concert that is higher than what either would be able to set
on his or her own. Though the participants may never speak to each
other, self-interested activity could lead each party to monitor the
other's pricing. One party could float a "tender" bid at a slightly
lower price to see if the other party would keep its higher price or
lower it to the tender bid. In a competitive market, the second
participant has incentive to keep his offer high95, however, in a
monopsony situation, if the participant lowers his bid to meet the
"tender" bid, sellers have no choice but to sell and both buyers get
the benefit of reduced costs. For example, in a transparent
marketplace for rolled steel, automakers would each submit their bids
to buy. Since each competitor could see each other's bids, none
would have incentive to offer a higher price than the other. In fact,
especially since there are so few buyers, each party would have
incentive to lower its bid. The other parties, witnessing one party
lower a bid, would be motivated to lower their bids to capture the
lower price for themselves. The seller who can only sell to a few
buyers in a monopsony will have to take one of the bids because no
other market exists for his product.
Bloch and Perlman have suggested two self-regulatory methods
for reducing the potential for the illegal exercise of monopsony power
through Internet marketplaces.96 First, they suggest limiting the
proportion of the relevant goods or services marketplace participants
are permitted to purchase through the marketplace.' By limiting
purchases in this way, participants will be unable to use the
marketplace to drive prices or collude. This restriction will
significantly undermine procompetitive benefits, however, by limiting
the purchase of certain goods or service to a small portion of overall
purchases, requiring the remainder of purchases to be handled
offline.
Second, Bloch and Perlman suggest limiting the number of
participants who may participate in joint purchasing agreements
through the marketplace once the total volume of purchases exceeds
a certain percentage of the relevant market.9" This could be
accomplished by either prohibiting involvement in joint purchasing
agreements once the agreement involves more than 30% of the total
95. Presumably, where there is limited product, sellers will sell to the higher bidder.
96. See Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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purchases, or by raffling off slots in the agreements for up to 30% of
the marketplace." This solution also undermines the procompetitive
advantages of Internet marketplaces by restricting the amount of
purchases of any product through the marketplace in the same
manner that restricting the amount of purchases of a good or service
would.
D. Information Sharing and the Problem of Collusion
Regardless of whether a marketplace is industry led, it is
necessary to protect buyers and sellers from collusion. Several types
of information sharing mechanisms promise to result in significant
efficiencies for marketplace participants, but also threaten to facilitate
collusion."0 While the exchange of information will ultimately work
to protect and foster competition in any marketplace, Chairman
Pitofsky has said, "there comes a point where there is so much
information being exchanged that it becomes anticompetitive.' 0'
Allowing companies to share past or present information about their
prices, even absent an explicit collusive agreement, would violate
current antitrust laws by permitting buyers and sellers to come up
with the same price and exclude parties from competition who do not
follow that pricing scheme. 2
Integrated supply chains permit completely transparent
information sharing. An integrated chain allows manufacturers to
monitor their customers' inventory levels through the marketplace.
When inventory levels for a particular part fall below a preset level,
the system automatically reorders the part from a pre-selected
vendor. The manufacturer has access to the vendors' inventory and
can see if they have the part in stock and whether it will be delivered
in time. The vendor, in turn, has access to the manufacturer's
inventory levels to be able to anticipate demand and prepare for
future orders. This type of supply chain integration, made famous by
Dell Computer and Wal-Mart, reduces procurement costs and keeps
inventory levels at a minimum."
99. See id. It is unclear why Bloch and Perlman suggest that a threshold of 30%
should be the limit, while the FTC's safe harbor has been limited to 20% of total
purchases. See GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 4.2.
100. For an involved discussion of different types of express and tacit joint agreements
concerning buying and selling, see William Blumenthal, B2B Internet Exchanges: The
Antitrust Basics, ANTITRUST REP., May 2000, at 34.
101. Krebs, supra note 24.
102 See id
103. This is known as "just in time" (JIT) inventory. A company that does not have to
spend money on maintaining an inventory level certain to ensure continual operations can
shift this money to more profitable enterprises.
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Marketplaces also result in cost reductions by price transparency
between buyers and sellers-each buyer will be able to see the price
of a product from multiple sellers and sellers can determine the
demand of a product by looking at the buying activity of other
sellers.' °' An improperly designed system would allow any participant
to determine the quantity and price of any product sold on the
exchange, which provides the tools for anticompetitive
coordination.1 5 Buyers, able to see what others are bidding for
products, could implicitly collude by not paying more than what other
buyers have bid. Sellers, knowing that their product cannot be
bought elsewhere, could set prices by not selling below what other
sellers have offered. The FTC's concern is that "rapid, costless, and
extensive exchange of information among sellers" can provide an
efficient method for sellers to implicitly coordinate prices.1°6 In a
properly structured market, however, "transparency can enhance
overall market efficiency and improve competitiveness.
1 °7
Even if a system were designed to keep bids and offers secret, all
the information would be available to the managers of the exchange.
In that situation, a close relationship between marketplace and
industry players increases the risk of collusion and impermissible
information sharing.'3 A prudent industry led marketplace would
allow the founders to contribute money and resources to the
marketplace, but fill all executive positions and board of directors
with independent third parties.
United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co. illustrates the
potential for abuse."° Eight airlines were accused of using an airfare
publishing joint venture to collude to set prices."'0 The venture
disseminated current airlines fares to travel agents and others and the
government contended that the airlines used this service to collude to
set prices."1 According to the government, the airlines were able to
collude by publishing advance pricing information-the fares airlines
104. See Blumenthal, supra note 100.
105. See id.
106. Johnathan B. Baker, Horitzontal Price-Fixing in Cyberspace, Speech Before the
Conference Board at the 1996 Antitrust Conference: Antitrust Issues in Today's
Economy (Mar. 7, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other
confbd4.htm.).
107. See Blumenthal, supra note 100.
108. Transcript, supra note 27, at 188-89 (workshop participant expresses concern that
industry led marketplaces would have difficulty keeping the available data from the
founders).
109. See United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1993); see
also United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,410 (D.D.C.
Nov. 1, 1994) (final consent decree).
110. See Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. at 10.
111. See id.
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planned to charge in the future." By knowing what other airlines
planned to charge for similar routes in the future, airlines could adjust
their prices accordingly to maximize profit.'
The potential for abuse is exacerbated in an Internet based B2B
marketplace. While the fare dissemination system in Airline Tariff
was limited to the fares of eight airlines, an exchange could
conceivably contain hundreds of thousands of products. Any one
central authority would have a difficult time monitoring for collusion
because of the sheer volume of transactions occurring. Vendors and
buyers of a particular product, however, would monitor prices
routinely. For example, if there are few buyers for a product, it is
within each buyer's best interest not to pay more than what others are
paying, which could be easily accomplished by monitoring others bids
on an unregulated exchange. These systems would also facilitate
more advanced collusion through forums that allow members to
communicate with each other, or placement of false offers or bids
merely to establish a price.
Most of these problems can be easily addressed through prudent
marketplace management. In an industry led exchange with a
pyramid or reverse pyramid shaped market, all bids and offers should
be sealed from everyone except the transaction participants. Though
some exchanges believe they can offer value to members with a price
history of transactions (allowing participants to search the transaction
history of a particular product to determine pricing), this can
potentially lead to collusion."' Safeguards would ensure that
marketplace participants could not access price or volume
information about competitors that would otherwise be
inaccessible."5 At the FTC workshop, DeSanti expressed her belief
that most information sharing issues can be addressed through use of
firewalls and access restrictions to ensure participants were only
viewing information directly related to their own transactions."6
Marketplaces which do want to disseminate aggregated data on
transaction history, such as price and volume statistics, must work to
ensure that the data cannot be used to facilitate anticompetitive
collusion. Two practitioners have suggested adhering to the safety
112. See icL
113. See id.
114. These problems exist in non-pyramid shaped markets, but the potential for abuse
is less significant. In a pyramid shaped market, only a few participants have to be
implicitly or explicitly colluding to injure consumers, requiring heightened vigilance in
these areas.
115. See Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28.
116. Transcript, supra note 27, at 14, 378-80, 389-91 (workshop panelists Gina Haines,
FacilityPro.com, and Roy Roberts, M-Xchange.com, echoing DeSanti's belief that
information sharing issues can be adequately addressed).
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zone for dissemination of fee-related data among competing health
care providers'17 found in Statement No. 5 of the Justice Department
and Federal Trade Commission's Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement in Health Care."" According to Bloch and Perlman, to
meet the safe harbor:
(a) the data should be collected by a third party (e.g., an outside
accounting firm or other consultant), or an employee of the
exchange who is not a current or former employee of any
competing member of the exchange; (b) the data should be more
than three months old; and (c) there should be at least five parties
providing data for each data point, no individual party's data
should represent more than 25 percent on a weighted basis for any
data point, and the data should be sufficiently aggregated so that
they will not allow recipients to identify the prices charged or costs
of goods for any individual competitor."
Under this regime, a marketplace could provide relevant data to
participants without concern for anticompetitive collusion.
Patrick Stewart, a panelist at the FTC workshop, advocated the
importance of enacting strict antitrust guidelines that can be enforced
against marketplace participants . 2 ° Every company that wishes to
become a market participant can be required to agree to limit the use
of proprietary information obtained from the marketplace. These
agreements can be enforced through sanctions such as terminating
membership or requiring a founding member to sell his equity in the
marketplace.12 ' A comprehensive plan should include agreements
that cover employees and a method of auditing the manner in which
the marketplace manages proprietary information."
E. Exclusivity and Standard Setting Procedures
A marketplace has the potential to increase competition among
industry players through lower transaction costs only if it is an "open
platform" for all buyers and sellers in the industry."n The
marketplace is not required to admit all who desire entry. The
117. See Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28.
118. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH CARE, STATEMENT No.5 (1996) [hereinafter STATEMENTS
OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT].
119. See Bloch & Pelman, supra note 28; see also Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement, supra note 118.
120. Transcript, supra note 27, at 30.
121. Id
122. Id.
123. See Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28; see also United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n
of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (competitor collaboration violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act by excluding non-members from using terminals, where terminal use was
necessary to compete).
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Supreme Court has recognized that a joint venture of competitors
may exclude others so long as the exclusion is supported by a business
justification of "enhanc[ing] overall efficiency and mak[ing] markets
more competitive."'24 In Allied Tube, a joint venture member had
"packed" a committee vote to exclude a competitors products from a
report." Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that a joint
venture that uses objective business justifications to evaluate
products, and by extension, members, can have significant pro-
competitive benefits."6
Similarly, in Northwest Wholesale, the Court held that denial of
access is not permissible where "the cooperative possesses market
power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective
competition."'27  In Northwest Wholesale, denial of access to a
participant was permitted where the cooperative lacked any market
power."z The Court applied Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
which held that procedural safeguards are required when denying
access to a cooperative with market power.'29 Together, Allied Tube,
Northwest Wholesale, and Silver indicate that a joint venture may
legitimately exclude industry players without procedural safeguards
or legitimate business reasons. Once a marketplace has achieved a
critical mass endowing market power, however, exclusion is subject to
more rigid scrutiny. Northwest Wholesale suggested that exclusion
from a joint venture "might justify per se invalidation [of the joint
venture] if it placed a competing firm at a severe competitive
disadvantage."'3
It is clear that a rule requiring all members to be active
participants in the industry or to be creditworthy to become a
member of the marketplace would be permissible under Allied Tube,
however, a rule of eligibility which tends to exclude smaller
manufacturers, wholesalers, or retailers from accessing a marketplace
through minimum transaction requirements, may raise
anticompetitive concerns.' If smaller players were kept from
participating, the anticompetitive effects would get worse as the
transaction volume in the marketplace grew and eventually, the lack
124. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); see
also N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294-
97 (1985).
125. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 496-97.
126. lId at 500; cf. Am. Soc. of Mech. Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
570-71 (1982) (absence of objective standards).
127. 472 U.S. 284,296 (1985).
128. Id
129. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
130. 472 U.S. at 295-96 n.6.
131. See Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28; see also Enforcers, supra note 72, at 6.
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of access to the marketplace could effectively exclude a company
from participating in the industry altogether.132 In her remarks at the
FTC public workshop on B2B marketplaces, Susan DeSanti, Director
of Policy Planning, said the FTC will determine whether excluding
certain rivals from the marketplace "significantly raises rivals"'
costs.
133
Exclusivity concerns are heightened when dominant players in
the industry own the marketplace. Covisint's founders, GM, Ford,
DaimlerChrysler, Renault, and Nissan represent well over the 20% of
purchasing that FTC Policy and Evaluation Office Assistant Director
David Balto intimated would be a safe harbor."34 Again, reasons why
marketplaces must be run by market participants with a substantial
market share have not been well articulated; this increases the risks
that the marketplace will be used to obtain illegal advantages.35
Marketplaces are neither prohibitively risky nor unable to raise
capital through private markets; therefore, industry involvement is
not clearly necessary.'36 In an industry led marketplace, market forces
would not correct a bias against a particular player by another,
stronger participant. While any marketplace needs credibility to
attract users beyond the founding members, in an industry led
marketplace, the founding members are able to coerce their current
vendors and buyers to use the exchange.'37 A marketplace that
doesn't have credibility among its members would lose business to
other more credible exchanges." There are no credible alternatives
to an industry led marketplace because the major suppliers or buyers
would only use the system they founded and own.13 Without rigorous
antitrust scrutiny, smaller industry players without leverage would be
stuck in a situation rigged against them.
While rival exchanges may not have a problem raising the
necessary funding or creating the marketplace itself, they will have
difficulty generating a sufficient amount of transactions to be a viable
competitor to industry led marketplaces. If the major players of an
industry have founded a marketplace, they will have incentive not to
distribute their business between their marketplace and rivals.
132. See Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28.
133. Susan S. DeSanti, The Evolution of Electronic B2B Marketplaces, Remarks
Before the FTC Public Workshop: Competition Policy in the World of B2B Electronic
Marketplaces (June 29, 2000) (transcript available at http:llwww.ftc.govlbclb2b/
b2bdesanti.htm).
134. FTC Enforcers Believe B2B Auctions Are Similar to JVs, supra note 72, at 6.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Covisint founding members will force their vendors to use the system. See
Covisint.com.
138. Transcript, supra note 27, at 368-75.
139. See Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28.
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Moreover, any agreement between competitors not to compete would
be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 " The FTC's
Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors assert that if the
agreement is ancillary to a joint venture with a procompetitive
purpose it will be evaluated under a rule of reason to determine if the
restraint on competition is "reasonably related to, and reasonably
necessary to achieve" the procompetitive benefits. 4' A reasonably
necessary restriction is a narrowly tailored situation where equivalent
or comparable efficiencies cannot be achieved through "practical,
significantly less restrictive means."' 42
Any exclusionary practice, such as a restriction on competition or
a minimum purchase requirement, must also withstand scrutiny under
the rule of reason, though it may be reasonably necessary.' Director
DeSanti has noted that it is necessary to examine the specific facts of
the exclusionary practice to determine if the impact on exchange
market is anticompetitive."4  An industry led marketplace that
dominates a significant portion of the industry will have difficulty




Internet B2B marketplaces can raise monopoly issues where
dominant industry players create marketplaces. Through network
effects, a marketplace led by dominant industry players can create a
monopoly in the market of exchanges serving that industry.146 If an
industry is only served by a few marketplaces, it may be possible for
one marketplace to capture all or a significant portion of the
transaction volume. This may be due to "internal growth, 'network
effects' that result in most industry participants flocking to what is
perceived to be the industry's leading exchange, restrictions on
member participation in rival exchanges, mergers with other
exchanges, or some combination of these factors." 47
If a marketplace is able to capture a significant amount of
transaction volume, the exchange may be able to exercise monopoly
power over fees by "increasing the fees it charges participants for its
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
othenvise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce..., is hereby declared to be
illegal.")
141. See GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 1.2.
142. lI
143. See Bloch & Perlman, supra note 28.
144. Id.
145. See GUIDELINES, supra note 53, § 3.36.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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services above, and/or by reducing the quality of those services below
what would prevail in a competitive market."'" This issue is
significant in light of the fact that many marketplace analysts believe
most industries will only be able to support two or three major
marketplaces and a few marketplaces serving niche markets.'49 Susan
DeSanti, Director at the FTC, has stated her belief that "network
effects may dictate that only a few marketplaces dominate the
industry.""
Conclusion
By the first months of 2002 the rush to develop independent B2B
marketplaces had died down as the capital markets began to
scrutinize business models more closely and their potential for profit.
Since late 1997, when B2B marketplace proponents first began
making claims of cost and speed efficiencies, few, if any, marketplaces
have actually lived up to expectations. Even under these conditions,
however, an industry led marketplace may offer benefits beyond price
and related efficiencies to industry players who believe that they
could force suppliers to reduce costs or earn higher margins on their
profits. The central issue in examining these exchanges will be to
evaluate the technology employed and the structure of the
organization to determine if the marketplace violates antitrust laws.
Pundits often lament that current analysis of the Sherman Act is
outmoded and does not apply to the business models of the new
economy. The contention is untenable. Markets are still markets,
regardless of what heralds of the new economy say, and can be
analyzed for existence of market power. Agreements may be
reviewed for naked and implicit anticompetitive restrictions. Though
the means may change, firms still seek the same advantages-lower
prices, broader markets, and lower transaction costs. The Sherman
Act, coupled with the rule of reason, is still a vibrant method for
limiting the power of firms who seek to go beyond what their
competitive place in the market otherwise entitles them, thereby
ensuring healthy competitive markets.
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 27, at 414-16, 431-32, & 443-44.
150. See DeSanti, supra note 133, at 16.
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